In light of the shortage of healthcare professionals, many developing countries operate a de facto two-tiered system of healthcare provision, in which Community Health Workers (CHWs) supplement service provision by fully qualified physicians. CHWs are relatively inexpensive to train but can treat only a limited range of medical conditions. This paper explicitly models a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs, and implications for population health outcomes. We analyze how medical migration alters resource allocation and population health outcomes, shifting resources towards training CHWs. In the model, migration stimulates health care provision at the lower end of the illness severity spectrum, improving health outcomes for those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions who can only be treated by doctors are made worse off. It is further shown that donor countries must be reimbursed by more than the training cost of emigrating physicians in order to restore aggregate population health to the pre-migration level -even though winners and losers persist. Host countries can still benefit from the import of healthcare professionals when compensating the donor country in this way.
Introduction
The steady increase in life expectancy experienced over the twentieth century is unprecedented in the broad sweep of history. As recently reviewed in Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney (2006) , average life expectancy at birth increased by almost 30 years in this period. Nonetheless, a gap of 30 years also at present remains between the average life expectancy in rich and poor countries. While this gap may be partly attributable to income growth disparities, as claimed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) , the bulk of the recent economic literature emphasizes the role of countries' institutional ability and political willingness to adopt and make existing healthcare technologies accessible to populations.
This encompasses both quantity and quality of care provided by health care systems, as shown by recent evidence (for example, Banerjee et al, 2004 and references therein).
This view is broadly consistent with the marked differences in the burden of disease borne by high and low income countries, reflected in the leading causes of mortality shown in Table 1 . Infectious and parasitic diseases, such as tuberculosis, diarrheal disease and malaria account for around 35 percent of deaths in low income countries and less than 2 per cent in high income countries. Maternal and perinatal mortality account for more than 10 percent of deaths in low income countries and less than 1 percent of mortality in rich countries. Hence, with the exception of HIV infection, the most prevalent conditions in low income countries are treatable (and some preventable) using existing drugs, treatments and public health interventions, most of them relatively inexpensive and not requiring cutting-edge equipment and infrastructure.
The World Health Report (WHO, 2006 acknowledges that the provision of relatively simple and inexpensive life-saving interventions, such as antenatal care, immunization and treatment of diarrhea, tuberculosis and malaria, is seriously constrained by a shortage of health workers in the developing world. Table 2 shows the density per 10,000 of population, of fully qualified doctors in Sub-Saharan African countries in 2004. Docquier (2008, 2012) We explicitly model a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision, characterize the optimal allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs and deduce implications for population health outcomes. As shown in Table 2 , many of the countries that operate this type of system experience high emigration rates of fully qualified doctors. We analyze how such migration affects resource allocation and population health outcomes, by altering the effective cost of training doctors, thereby shifting resources towards training CHWs. We
show that this resource reallocation may benefit patients affected by illnesses treated by CHWs, rendering worse-off sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions, which can only be treated by fully qualified physicians. Finally, we show that donor countries must be reimbursed by more than the training cost of emigrating physicians in order to restore aggregate population health to its pre-migration level. This compensatory payment does not prevent host countries from continuing to benefit from the importation of doctors.
Community health workers
3 The average density of fully qualified doctors per 10,000 of population is 27 in high income countries, roughly 10 times the minimum density established by the WHO for the accomplishment of the MDGs
The term 'Community Health Worker' is a blanket term used to describe lay members of the community who provide health services, following a short and targeted period of training 4 .
China's "barefoot doctors" are arguably the first and most well-known of this type of health worker. Launched in the 1950s, that program aimed at training lay community members to provide primary health care in rural areas where few qualified doctors wished to settle. The
Chinese example spawned a diverse range of healthcare programs throughout the developing world: a (non-exhaustive) list of countries that rely significantly on CHWs for health care provision is given in Table 3 according to a recent WHO report (WHO, 2010) . 4 According to Lehmann and Sanders (2007) , the most widely accepted definition of CHW is the one proposed in WHO (1989) : "Community health workers should be members of the community where they work, answerable to the communities for their activities, supported by the health system but not necessarily a part of its organization, and have shorter training than professional workers". Known by a wide range of country-specific designations, CHWs receive different forms of training and provide different types of care across countries. In most cases, however, their length of training varies from 6 months to two years and is therefore limited to a subset of conditions that a fully qualified doctor can treat. Systematic reviews of healthcare programs based on CHWs, such as WHO (2010) and Lehmann and Sanders (2007) , highlight their involvement in outreach activities and curative care in the areas shown in Figure 1 .
Coutry CHWs
Predictably, these mirror the leading conditions contributing to the burden of disease highlighted in Table 1 : a comprehensive range of highly prevalent conditions whose treatment rarely requires a fully qualified medical doctor and complex healthcare technology.
Figure 1. Main activities of CHWs in developing countries
Source: Lehmann and Sanders (2007) An important characteristic of CHWs is that they are members of the community in which they work. They are thus less likely to attrite and, crucially in our analysis, cannot emigrate since their qualifications are not valid outside their country 5 . 5 There is not an international market for CHWs since they are required to have profound knowledge of the local communities, including knowledge of language and culture.
Medical migration
Medical migration is frequently mentioned in the literature as a leading cause of poor health outcomes (Bundred and Levitt, 2000) and short supply of healthcare (for example Ashton et al., 2005) There is an extensive empirical literature on the overall effect of medical migration on population health outcomes in donor countries (see Docquier and Rapoport, 2012 , for an extensive review). As data are relatively scarce, causal effects are hard to establish and evidence is mixed. Despite these limitations, some associations are well established. Chauvet, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps (2008) show that medical migration is associated with a worsening of child health outcomes in a panel of 98 host countries; interestingly, their results further suggest that medical brain drain reduces the effectiveness of foreign health aid to these countries. Bhargava and Docquier (2008) corroborate the existence of a negative association between the migration of doctors and key population outcomes: doubling the rate of expatriation of fully qualified doctors is associated with a 20 percent increase in adult deaths from AIDS 6 .
While brain drain through medical migration is assumed to be detrimental in policy circles, the economic literature has also emphasized channels for potential gain from migration. As noted in Docquier and Rapoport (2012) evidence also suggests that a reduction in medical migration would only improve health outcomes in the donor country if complementary investments in drugs, equipment and infrastructure are also made. As noted by Cutler, D., Deaton, A. and Lleras-Muney, A. (2006) some countries spend so little in these inputs that health care is doomed to being ineffective, regardless of the availability of medics. Our analysis of the impact of the impact of availability of health workers on population health is thus conditional on the existence of at least a minimum level of complementary inputs. 7 The main donor countries represented in the sample were India (around 42%), Nigeria (8%) and South Africa (roughly 7%). Other Sub-Saharan Africa countries were also represented.
impoverished areas in need of care. Moreover, given that 70 per cent of the burden of disease in low-income countries is amenable to simple interventions, the relevance of newly acquired skills in rich countries has been called into question. For parsimony, we assume permanent emigration in our model. 
The model
This section presents a model of disease and optimal resource allocation to treat it using two types of medical personnel, with and without medical migration.
Model set-up
8 Mountford (1997) shows that brain gain hinges on two crucial premises: that migration prospects determine decisions to enroll into medical school and that migrants are not strongly screened by the host country. Kangasniemi, Winters and Commander (2007) find that, for medical migration towards the UK, the link between migration possibility educational choices is likely to be weak and that host countries clearly creamskim the best applicants; neither of the two crucial premises is thus likely to hold. Bhargava, Docquier and Moullan (2011) find only a small positive effect of migration prospects on the decision to undertake medical training, clearly insufficient to generate a sizable effect on a county's stock of doctors. As noted in Docquier and Rapoport (2012) , curtailing medical brain drain would, overall, increase staffing levels in developing countries.
Consider a population that suffers from illnesses of varying severity, denoted by s , where 
Thus, to bring a patient to full health, when she is treated by a health worker of type i , requires a treatment time of:
The time required is inversely proportional to the quality of the health worker. The cost of training a health care worker of type i is c i . Define the quality-adjusted cost as r i = c i / q i .
We assume that:
Inequality (2) is the usual assumption that producing a valued output (in this case, quality of care) comes at increasing marginal cost. We denote the budget available for training health care workers by M , measured in country per capita terms. If m i is the fraction of the population trained to be a health care worker of type i , then the budget constraint is:
m i can be interpreted as the man-hours available to provide health care services of type i to the population. The total time spent on patients by health workers of type i must therefore not exceed m i .
We measure social welfare (as far as health is concerned) as the mean of the logarithms of the health statuses of the population. Define the post-treatment health status of an individual with illness of severity s as u(s) ; of course, this depends upon the type of health worker assigned to him, and the time spent on treatment. The social objective is then:
and the optimization problem is to decide how many doctors and CHWs to train, and how to assign them to treating patients with various severities of disease. Note that, if everyone in the population were brought to full health, then post-treatment health status would be u(s) = 1 for all, and the expression in (5) would be zero. Therefore, in general, the expression in (5) is negative, and we can therefore view −W as the post-treatment burden of disease in the population, for this is the precisely the amount by which disease reduces the welfare of the population. Using this terminology, we can view
as the amount by which the burden of disease in the society is reduced by health care.
A preliminary step for allocating resources optimally is the observation that:
Lemma 
We define:
where Q is a 'truncated mean' function. It is now possible to characterize the optimal resource allocation under certain premises. In particular:
Proposition 1 Suppose that:
9 It is interesting that this result applies generally, for all budget levels and distributions of illness, hinging on the increasing marginal cost of quality of healthcare. This may explain why CHWs are trained and deployed also in rich countries, such as the USA. 10 The objective function of program (7) can be written this way by Lemma 1.
Then the solution to program (7) is given by:
where is the unique solution of the equation:
The values of (m 1 ,m 2 ) are given by constraints (i) and ( Social welfare at the optimal solution can be computed based on equation (5) and is given by:
It is interesting that health status takes a saltus downward at ŝ , from (s * /ŝ) to r 2 r 1 (s * /ŝ) .
So patients whose illness is slightly less severe than are 'significantly' better off, treated by the CHW, than patients whose illness is slightly more severe than , who are treated by the doctor. This will not be the case for all possible problems. Proposition 1 only characterizes the optimal solution for problems characterized by premises (9)((i)-(iii)).
Proposition 1 deals only with the case where M lies in the interval defined by (9)(iii).
There are two other cases:
We may think of case 2 as that of a very impoverished country, and case 3 as that of a relatively well-off country. The case we have analyzed thus far (case 1) is that of a country with a 'middling' amount of health resources.
The optimal solution to (7) for cases 2 and 3 can be gleaned by examining the borderline case between cases 1 and case 2, and the borderline case between case 1 and case 3. The first of these is characterized by the equation:
while the second borderline case is characterized by the equation:
In the situation of (15), we see that s * = r 1 r 2 . Here, the fraction of patients who are brought up to full health by treatment by CHWs is minimal. If is reduced further, and we enter case 2, patients with an even smaller range of illness severity will be restored to full health.
On the other hand, the situation of (16) corresponds to s * =ŝ : in other words, there will be sufficient CHWs trained to restore all patients in the interval [1,ŝ] to full health. Any further increase in M (bringing us into case 3) will be used to train more doctors, and the benefits will redound to those with more severe illnesses, in (ŝ,∞) .
Medical migration
This section examines comparative statics of the optimal solution characterized in Proposition 1 in the context of outward medical migration of doctors, who are trained at public expense, but then take jobs in rich countries. In contrast, CHWs are assumed to remain geographically immobile. These assumptions are backed by the strong evidence presented in section 1, which points to high rates of outward migration of fully qualified M physicians from developing countries, whereas CHWs lack the formal qualifications to fill medical posts abroad.
Denote by π the fraction of doctors who, after training, stay in the country, and by 1− π the fraction that migrates. The effect of migration in optimization problem (7) 
Resource allocation with migration
The equations that characterize the optimal values s*,m 1 ,m 2 ( ) are:
which comprise three equations in the three unknowns s*,m 1 ,m 2 ( ) .
Equation (17) is the binding constraint (i) of program (7) at the optimal solution, (18) is binding constraint (ii) of (7), and (19) is equation (11). Throughout, c 1 / π has been substituted for c 1 .
The Jacobian of this system with respect to these three variables is:
We now differentiate the three equations with respect to π , which gives the vector:
By the implicit function theorem, the derivatives of the optimal values of s*,m 1 ,m 2 ( ) with respect to π are given by:
or J ∂s * / ∂π ∂m 1 / ∂π
Solving these three equations for the derivatives at π = 1 gives:
This means that as π decreases from a value of one, s * increases, and more CHWs are trained.
Because m 2 increases as π decreases, it immediately follows from the budget constraint that ∂m 1 ∂π > 0 , although this may not be obvious from (21). In sum, we have shown: The effect on the burden of disease from migration of doctors is, of course, of key interest.
We thus compute the effect on burden from migration. From equation (12) we see that W is a function of s * , so we have:
Expressing the change in welfare as an elasticity with respect to π gives:
Evaluating this elasticity for the example described earlier gives:
This means that if π falls from one to 0.9, welfare will decrease (or the burden of disease will increase) by approximately 4.3%.
The effect of an increase in physician migration on the number of doctors and CHWs at the optimal solution for the country can be found by computing the elasticities of m 1 and m 2 with respect to π . These are evaluated using the equations in (21):
and
For our example, the elasticities evaluate to:
In other words, a fall in the fraction of doctors staying in the country from unity to 0.9 reduces the number of doctors practicing in the country by 23.7 %, at the optimal allocation, and increases the number of CHWs trained by 4.0%. Because of the effective increase in the price of training doctors, the fraction of doctors trained falls (in this example) by more than twice the loss due to migration. Moreover, from the first derivative in (21), the effect of migration is to increase s * . The increase in the number of CHWs implies that patients with illnesses in the interval [0,ŝ] actually are better off with some physician migration; they have more CHWs to treat them. The brunt of the increase in the burden of disease is borne entirely by patients with illnesses too severe for CHWs to treat. This result is comprehensible if we recall that the objective of program (7) is to maximize an average of utilities in the population. As doctors become effectively more expensive due to the leakage of migration, it is optimal to substitute CHWs for doctors: but since CHWs are constrained to treat only relatively minor illnesses, patients with those illnesses have improved outcomes.
Health outcomes with migration
It is instructive to examine the changes in the health status of the population as doctors migrate in our example. The post-treatment health status distribution at the optimal staffing allocation with no migration, and the pre-treatment distribution of health status, are graphed in Figure 2 . There are three regions: for s < s* = 2.248 , CHWs treat patients to full health; in the region s* < s <ŝ = 3 , CHWs spend the same amount of time on each patient, improving health status but not restoring patients to full health; finally, for s >ŝ , patients are treated by doctors, who spend an equal amount of time on each patient, again not bringing their patients up to full health. The saltus downward in patient health status can be seen at s =ŝ . Now we incorporate outward migration by assuming π = 0.9 ; that is, 10% of the doctors migrate. Solving for the new severity threshold and optimal resource allocation between training doctors and CHWs allows us to graph the post-treatment health status distribution under migration ( π = 0.9 ) and without migration, in Figure 3 . Increasing the migration rate further reinforces the mechanisms discussed, so that even more CHWs are trained and there is a further increase in s *. The less severely ill enjoy better outcomes, while fewer doctors treat the severely ill. The distribution of health outcomes for the higher migration corresponding to π = 0.75 is illustrated with the previous two cases in Figure 4 .
The basic intuition behind these patterns, driven by (21), is as follows. Increasing migration is reflected in an increase in the effective cost of training doctors -for the cost of training a doctor who will be available in the country is c 1 π . Consequently, an increase in migration increases the relative cost of the more expensive healthcare input, and so the Ministry economizes by hiring fewer of them. In fact, after migration, in the optimal solution, the Ministry spends less in total on training doctors than before, implying more expenditure on training CHWs given an unchanged budget. This is why those who are not severely ill actually benefit from the migration of doctors. 
Resource allocation and health outcomes with reimbursement
Now suppose migrating doctors are taxed, or the donor country receives a reimbursement from the countries to which they migrate, equal to the cost of their training. Migration thus increases the budget available to the Ministry to train doctors and CHWs, giving rise to a new optimal resource allocation.
While the ministry has an increased budget, it is still the case that doctors have become more expensive (because the real cost of training must account for the leakage of doctors to other countries). So although the budget has increased to compensate for the lost training expenditure, the cost of training doctors has also increased. What will the new optimal allocation look like?
Assume migration changes from zero to 10%, so π changes from 1, to 0.9. To proceed we need to specify training costs and quality levels, let us take: c 1 = 3.8, and q 1 = 2, which is consistent with r 1 = 1.9 . Solving constraint (7) (ii), which is binding at the optimal allocation, we find that the optimal number of trained doctors in the pre-migration case represent m 1 = 3.05% of the population. With the cost of their medical education received, the new budget equation becomes:
The explanation of the last term of (27) is as follows: the number of doctors trained is m 1 π , so that m 1 doctors are available in the country; fraction (1− π) of these migrates, so the cost of their training is therefore m 1 π (1− π)c 1 . Hence to solve for the optimal policy when there is full reimbursement, we replace equation (19) with (27).
Continuing with our example, in Figure 5 we plot the post-treatment health status distribution under full reimbursement where the migration rate is 10%, along with the no migration case. The burden of disease is larger than in the no-migration case, even when there is full reimbursement. We see that the Ministry trains more CHWs and fewer doctors than in the pre-migration situation, even when they are fully reimbursed. This is because, although the ministry's budget has increased, it remains true that the relative price of training doctors has increased. The upshot is: even reimbursing for the full cost of their training, the country is worse off after the migration.
Suppose, then, that either the migrating doctors or the host country pays back 125% of the cost of training the migrants. Now the budget constraint becomes:
Does this allow the home country to reduce the burden of disease to the pre-migration level? Figure 6 illustrates health outcomes under 125% reimbursement, along with the noreimbursement scenario. Now the burden of disease is slightly less than in the no-migration case: it has fallen to 0.6580 from 0.6588. So, for this example, the reimbursement that renders the home country as well off (in the aggregate) as under no migration is approximately 125% of the training cost of migrating physicians. We note, nevertheless, from figure 5, that the distribution of treatment is not the same after the reimbursement as in the no-migration case: it continues to be true that care is shifted from more to less severe cases. Now consider the effect of these migrants on the health of the country to which they emigrate. Their immigration to the host increases the supply of doctors there. Suppose the cost of training a doctor in the host country is C 1 > c 1 . Further suppose the host country bears the entire burden of the reimbursement cost required to lower the burden of disease in the exporting country to the pre-migration level, where this cost is αc 1 , where we have noted that α > 1. Suppose all migrants go to this host, and the host wishes to produce a supply of doctors M 1 ; then total demand for doctors in the host is
where M 1 is the number it trains. Thus its total cost of training is C 1M1 + αc 1 (1− π) m 1 π , and its cost per available physician is:
Provided αc 1 < C 1 , the host country is getting a good deal -it is getting relatively inexpensive doctors. It is therefore perfectly feasible for the host country to reimburse the donor country more than the cost of training, and for both countries to thereby benefit.
One way of justifying the fairness of a reimbursement scheme that more than compensates for the cost of physician training in the developing country is to consider the bargaining game that would arise if the donor country were able to stop migration. The donor and host countries would have to negotiate over the number of doctors permitted to migrate, and the level of compensation by the host. Under Nash bargaining, where the threat point is zero migration, the solution to this bargaining problem would be that the host reimburses the poorer donor so that its burden of disease is lower than under no migration. In other words, both countries would benefit from the bargain. Due to civil libertarian mores and administrative capacity constraints, the donor country is not in a position to curtail the migration of doctors as part of the bargaining game. It can be argued, however, that it is fair for the poor country to receive what it could bargain for in that hypothetical world.
Conclusion
A shortage of medical personnel has been addressed in developing countries through the systematic training and deployment of CHWs who supplement healthcare provision by fully qualified doctors. Our analysis develops a model of a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs, as well as the implications for population health outcomes. Outward medical migration of physicians distorts the cost of training doctors relative to geographically immobile CHWs, thereby shifting resources towards training CHWs. Since CHWs can only treat a limited range of illnesses, the additional investment in training of CHWs can only give rise to additional treatment of relatively low severity illness.
While migration increases the burden of disease in society overall, it stimulates health care provision at the lower end of the illness-severity spectrum, improving health outcomes for those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions who can only be treated by doctors are made worse off.
We show that it is necessary for donor countries to be reimbursed by more than the training cost of emigrating physicians in order to restore the overall burden of disease in society to its pre-migration level. Moreover, host countries are shown to be able to pay back considerably more than the cost of training these immigrant doctors, and still benefit in terms of health.
Winners and losers in the donor country persist, due to the price effects, although the aggregate burden of disease can be restored.
In a hypothetical world where donor countries could prevent migration, the number of emigrating doctors and the level of reimbursement would be the outcome of a bargaining game between donor and host. In such a setting, the donor country would be reimbursed by more than is required to restore overall population health. This provides a normative justification for the view that recipients of fully qualified medical personnel through migration should substantially compensate developing countries. where the inequality follows from assumption (3). Hence it is not optimal to treat these patients using doctors.
Proof of Proposition 1:
1. Observe first that , so is increasing.
2. The proof is based on the fact that program (7) 7. Now, the coefficient of on the interval reduces to: 
